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# Glimpses Of The Superspies

By JOHN S. KENNEDY

A great many Americans are both fascinated and mystified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and not a few are sharply critical of it. The criticism stems from the supposition that the Bay of Pigs fiasco can be laid to the CIA, from CIA activities in Vietnam, from the revelation that the CIA subsidized the National Student Association for a number of years. The CIA is seen as seeking to be virtually omnipresent and omniscient, while cloaked in the secrecy which must characterize an intelligence organization.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., author of *The Real CIA* (Macmillan, \$6.95), is a former executive director of the agency. He was connected with it from its establishment in 1947 until his resignation in 1965. Before 1947, he served, during World War II, with the Office of Strategic Services and, after the war, with the Central Intelligence Group. All told, he spent 23 years in intelligence work.

"All told." A familiar expression. Naturally, it does not apply to Mr. Kirkpatrick's book, for anyone presently or formerly involved in intelligence cannot tell all. Mr. Kirkpatrick certainly does not do so in these pages. One does not expect him to. Yet the reader experiences bafflement and annoyance rather frequently, as persons and incidents are referred to not merely obliquely but extremely fuzzily. One then has no notion of whom or what the author is talking about.

This detracts considerably from the book's interest and effectiveness. Granted that no inside story of the CIA can be set forth by anyone save perhaps a defector, no more can anyone give us "the real CIA" when writing with the deliberate vagueness that Mr. Kirkpatrick is often obliged to use.



LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK JR.

NONETHELESS, what he has to say, is worth reading. It gives a general idea of the history, resources, and activities of the CIA, the importance of intelligence work, and the great advance in this respect which the United States has made in a little over 20 years.

"Perhaps the most important duty of the CIA," says Mr. Kirkpatrick, "and its head, the director of Central Intelligence, is the coordination of the total intelligence effort of the United States." There was a complete lack of anything of the sort previous to 1947, and indeed, American intelligence may be said to have been merely occasional up until then.

Thus, after the United States had depended largely on British Intelligence during World War I, Secretary of State Henry Stimson, in the early 1920's, abolished his department's cryptographic department (for breaking codes and cyphers), saying, "Gentlemen don't read other

It was Pearl Harbor which demonstrated the need of intelligence, and especially of its coordination. The State Department, the Navy, the F.B.I., for example, had some information as to what the Japanese might be up to, but it was never assembled in one place, analyzed, and evaluated, with the results laid before the President so that he could decide on action.

Mr. Kirkpatrick did not set out to be an intelligence expert. After graduation from Princeton, he went into journalism in Washington. In 1941, he was drawn into what was to be his intelligence career when William J. Donovan was in charge of the Office of Coordinator of Information. This office was soon split up into the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. Mr. Kirkpatrick was briefly in the first, then transferred to the second.

In 1942, he was sent to England, went into France just after the Allied Invasion in 1944, later became chief briefing officer for General Omar Bradley, and was present at some of the most important topmost command conferences during the fighting in Europe.

MR. KIRKPATRICK gives some 60 pages to his wartime experiences, and these are the liveliest and most

communicative in the book. His account of intelligence work then, and of so called irregular warfare, of men like Bradley and Patton, of his mission to a Nazi concentration camp just overrun by American forces, is graphic.

With victory in Europe, he was to be transferred to the Pacific, but the Japanese surrender came before he could take up his new assignment. Back in the United States, he resumed his journalistic work. Not, however, for long.

*Original filed under Kennedy*